New Study: Political Literacy Is the Only Effective Remedy for Political Hatred and Polarization
This report was presented in an op-ed in *Dagens Nyheter* by Robert L. Svensson and Torbjörn Sjöström; the op-ed can be read here (June 25, 2026):
“The political elite is driving polarization—not the algorithms”
In an increasingly polarized political climate, many are searching for solutions to political hatred. Our study shows that the answer lies neither in reduced party loyalty nor in increased trust in democracy—the only effective antidote is political knowledge.
When researchers want to describe the animosity between different groups based on their political preferences, they refer to affective —that is, emotional—polarization. The concept stems from social identity theory, developed in the 1970s, which posits that individuals tend to construct their identities based on the social group with which they identify. In an increasingly polarized political climate, researchers have observed over the past few decades how partisan identities—particularly in the United States—have increasingly come to trump social identities based on class, gender, or ethnicity. Affective polarization—and thus political hatred—between voter groups has increased in tandem with this trend.
To study the state of affective polarization among Swedish voters and the individual factors driving it, we commissioned Novus to conduct a survey among Swedish voters. The survey was conducted in April during the 2026 election year. In the survey, voters were asked whether they identified as supporters of a particular political party, which party they would vote for if an election were held today, and where they placed themselves on an ideological left-right scale. We also asked them questions about how meaningful they find voting in democratic elections and how strong their faith in democracy is. We measured their political knowledge by asking them to place the eight Swedish parliamentary parties on the left-right scale, which we then compared to a reference list based on how researchers at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University had ranked those same parties. The survey was conducted as part of a bachelor’s thesis at the same university.
The results clearly show that a party-political identity and strong ideological radicalism predict a high degree of affective polarization. Although this is hardly surprising to anyone, it is perhaps more surprising that if a voter perceives voting in general elections as meaningful and has a high level of trust in democracy, affective polarization is also expected to increase in this case, albeit to a significantly milder degree. The only variable that causes the curve for an individual’s expected affective polarization to turn downward—and sharply so—is political knowledge, that is, knowledge of where the parties’ policies actually fall on the ideological scale. Our analysis shows that an individual’s level of knowledge has over thirteen times the impact on political hatred than a high level of trust in democracy, and nearly nine times the impact of a strong party identity.
One way to understand the results is to apply them to other groups with a clear social identity: soccer fans. A soccer fan who strongly identifies with a team, who seeks out so-called “ultras” groups in the standing-room-only sections of the stadium, and who has a strong belief in the value of fans to their own team’s performance is likely also someone who feels strong antipathy toward other teams. It is also likely that this fan holds well-articulated prejudices about what characterizes fans of other teams.
At the same time, one can assume that someone who prioritizes their interest in the game over their identity as a supporter of a particular team is also more likely to develop their knowledge of soccer and become better at analyzing what happens on the field. This should also mean that the knowledgeable soccer fan is less likely to get swept up in hatred toward the opposing team. We also know that even the most passionate soccer fans are able to talk to one another outside the stadiums. They meet at work, at family dinners, or in other social settings, and even though they may joke with one another, it’s hard to imagine them severing ties with someone based on which soccer team they support. Although the strong emotions associated with soccer can sometimes lead to major disturbances of the peace and serious outbreaks of violence, these are isolated incidents. They do not pose a threat to the system.
Emotional polarization in the political arena, on the other hand, is a potential threat to democracy. Strong emotional reactions toward supporters of another party hinder the objective discussion that is generally viewed as a key element of a functioning and stable democracy. Just as soccer fans are able to discuss a penalty kick situation in hindsight, once the replays have been shown in slow motion and emotions have subsided, political opponents need to be able to discuss and seek solutions to policy issues even if differences in their ideologically based visions persist.
German studies show that policy-based polarization among voters is generally much less pronounced than it is perceived to be. The fact that political effectiveness and trust in democracy increase affective polarization suggests that polarization is not necessarily driven by distrust, but rather by engagement. If we are to curb affective polarization, we also need to counteract the conflation of social and political identity while increasing political literacy—that is, knowledge of what the parties actually stand for in terms of policy.
However, we have a political elite that does the opposite, eagerly cheered on by media outlets that see how political posturing and sharp rhetoric capture the public’s attention. Here, party strategists and leading politicians often act as nothing more than “polarization entrepreneurs.” By pressing on value-based trigger points in issues such as migration or climate change, they create the illusion of insurmountable divides to score political points, while at the same time concealing the fact that voters are actually often in relative agreement on the underlying issues. Questions about what the parties intend to do are also all too often answered with accusations against other parties.
If we want to stop polarization, our politicians and our media must therefore take responsibility for not fueling it. The political discourse is still shaped by the interaction between the political elite and the mainstream media, even though social media accounts for a large part of the dissemination of the messages that are formulated. Voters deserve to be informed about the policies the parties intend to pursue and the political goals they aim to achieve. The responsibility for this lies equally with the media, which ask the questions, and with the politicians, who provide the answers.
Robert L. Svensson
Read the full research paper here: The Polarization Engine: A Study of Affective Polarization and Its Driving Forces in the 2026 Election Year